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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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STATE OF UTAH,

)
(

Plaintiff and Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT

)

vs.

) Case No. 970726-CA

GARY WAYNE SPAINHOWER,

)

Defendant and Appellant.

)
(

Priority No. 2

Comes now the appellant, the above-named natural mother, by and
uhrough counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and, pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, hereby replies to the State of Utah's new matters set forth as follows:
SUMMARY ARGUMENT
(1)

The State misstates and mis-argues the issues before this Court.

The case at hand is not a sufficiency of the evidence case. Rather, this case appealed
deals with issues of law. Surely only issues dealing with evidence and judge level
decisions are being challenged on appeal. Nonetheless, the defendant has sufficiently

addressed and mustered all of the facts for this Court to consider.
(2)

The defendant's conviction was unconstitutionally disproportionate

to the alleged conduct. The defendant failed to commit a felony level offense.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE IS MISTAKEN ABOUT THE ISSUE ON APPEAL.
The State mistakenly argues that the defendant's appeal deals with the
mustering of evidence as it deals with sufficiency of the juror verdict. That is not the
issue on appeal. As a matter of law, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the State
fails it's burden to prove each element of the offense. It is the judge duty to determine
questions of law and the jury duty to determine questions of fact. In this action, the
defendant has raised questions of law. The judge as the arbiter has the duty to
determine the admissibility of evidence, before he hands the case over to the jury as the
trier of fact. Moreover, only the judge-not the jury-makes conclusions of law. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-21-3 (1953, as amended) provides:
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings,
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and all
discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is by
law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the jury,
who are bound to accept it.
Id. In this matter, the defendant moved the court for a dismissal on the basis that the

2

State failed to meet it's burden of proof to establish each element of offense charged.1
The defendant's motion was required the judge to conclude as a matter of law, whether
the State proved each of the elements. State v. Ramirez,2 and State v. Nelson,3 both
address the roles of the judge and jury, however, not quite on point with this action.
These two cases addressed the issues of admissibility, where in this matter the
defendant raises an issue dealing with a conclusion of law. Section 76-1-501 requires a
determination that the prosecution has presented a prima facie case including all the
elements of the offense-in this case a violation of Subsection 76-8-508(2). Upon the
State's closing, the defense moved for a dismissal as the prosecution failed to establish
that the defendant conveyed a thre-ii ilt il i "bodily ni|ui v "" I Jn . . none . . . zero
evidence was presented in this matter dealing with a threat to do bodily injury. That is
1

Utah Code Ann. 76-1-501 (1953, as amended) provides:

(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed,
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but
shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. (Emphasis added).
2

299 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 924 P.2d 366, (Court of Appeals, September 12, 1996).

3

333 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 950 P.2d 940 (Court of Appeals, December 26, 1997).
3

the issue on appeal.
Moreover, the conviction absent proof that the defendant intended a threat
to do bodily injury causes the conviction in this matter to be disproportionate. The
defendant's threat does not amount to felonious conduct, rather the allegations better
warrants a misdemeanor punishment. In State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997), the
Utah Supreme Court addressed the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Analogous to
Gardner, the defendant claims that his felony conviction of the alleged offense is
disproportionately cruel and unusual. The Gardner Court stated:
We have held that the standard for cruel and unusual punishment claims in specific
applications is "'"whether the sentence imposed in proportion to the offense committed
is such as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper
under the circumstances."'" Monson, 928 P.2d at 1024 (quoting State v. Russell, 791
P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah
1988))); see also Andrews, 843 P.2d at 1030; State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah
1981); State v. Nance, 20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P.2d 542, 544 (1968).
Id. In this matter, imprisonment is proportionately cruel under the circumstances.
Absent any clear threat TO DO BODILY INJURY the threat actually conveyed is
analogous to one associated with harassment or stalking-as previously argued. Clearly
it is not proper and shocks the moral sense of any reasonable man to convicted a
physically handicapped individual to prison for being obnoxious. It appears from the
evidence presented that the defendant's intent to harass was accomplished and he did
not actually intend to inflict bodily injury. At no time has the defendant every been
convicted of any violent crimes that would reasonably lead one to believe that his
intentions were to threaten bodily injury. Remember, Sherry Reeves fears were pre4

existing the incident-as conceded by the State-because of the defendants lummox size
and anti-social mannerisms. However, the defendant is as gentle as a child. Mr.
Spainhower is prone to be inquisitive, easily confused, and repetitive just like a child.
In order for the defendant's conduct to be felonious he needed to
expressly convey a threat to do bodily injury or the conduct had to be a criminal act.
Absent a criminal act or absent the actual threat to do bodily injury the defendant has
not committed this felony offense. To aid this Court in understanding, the defendant
points the Court to the well-established rules of statutory construction.
As stated in State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah
Court of Appeals commanded:
Both Serpente and Kennedy relied upon statutory construction doctrine of
ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, "of the same
kind" and its companion of noscitur a sociis, "it is known from its
associates," when general terms follow specific ones, the general terms
must be restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific terms.
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (citing In re
Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 1983);
see also Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 369-70, 374 P.2d 839, 840
(1962).
Id. Under these rules, the Court must harmonize it's different parts to understand the
prohibited conduct. Doing so, will assist this Court in determining whether the conduct
is constitutionally proportionate. Each subsection of 76-8-508 needs to be used to guide
the Court's understanding what was intended and whether each of the elements were
fully established properly at trial before the judge was to hand the case over

5

to the jury. In this matter, it is quite clear that the defendant had not committed a
felony. The defendant's conviction of a felony was unconstitutionally disproportionate.
CONCLUSION
Upon a review of these issues for correctness, this Honorable Court to
overturn both appeals as a matter of law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of
November, 1998.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 12th day of November,
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the
counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: Kris C. Leonard, Office
of the Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114-0854.
Dated this 12th day of November, 1998.

D. BRUCE OLIVER

ADDENDUM A

Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

582

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of s p e e c h and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections t o b e free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — E x post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1866
Sec. 2 1 . [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
18*
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise
privilege or immunity.
18*
Sec. 24. [Uniform o p e r a t i o n of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
18*

Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impai
or deny others retained by the people.
**•
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory an
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to b
18S
otherwise.
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Utah Criminal and Traffic Code

that the falsification was or would be exposed.
1997
76-8-504. Written false statement.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(1) H e makes a written false statement which he
does not believe t o be true o n or pursuant to a form
bearing a notification authorized by law to the
effect that false statements made therein are punishable; or
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the
performance of his official function, he:

(a) Makes any written false statement which he
does not believe to be true; or
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a
written application for any pecuniary or other
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent
statements therein from being misleading; or
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing
which he knows t o be lacking in authenticity; or
(d) Submits o r invites reliance on any sample,
specimen, m a p , boundary mark, or other object
which he knows t o be false.
(3) N o person shall be guilty under this section if
he retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed.

aperiag with juror - Retattattoa aaaiast
ty.
^ ^
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id before it substantially affected the
1997
s o r inconsistent m a t e r i a l

76-8-505. False or inconsistent statements •
Proof of falsity of statements - Irregularities no
defense.
(1) O n any prosecution for a violation of Subsection 76-8-502 (1) or 76-8-503 OXa), falsity of
a statement m a y not be established solely through
contradiction by the testimony of a single witness.
(2) In prosecutions for violation of Subsection 768-502 (2) or 76-8-503 (1Kb), it need not be
alleged or proved which of the statements are false
but only that o n e or the other is false and not believed by the defendant t o be true.
(3) It is not a defense t o a charge under this part
that the oath o r affirmation was administered or
taken in a n irregular manner.
1997
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law
enforcement officers, government agencies, or
specified professionals.

s guilty of a felony of the second
' official proceeding:
es a false material statement under
ion or swears or affirms the truth of
ment previously made and he does
atement to be true; or
* inconsistent material statements
firmation, both within the period of
of which is false and not believed
1997
r inconsistent statements.
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A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(1) knowingly gives o r causes to be given false
information t o any peace officer with a purpose of
inducing t h e officer t o believe that another has
committed a n offense; o r
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given t o any
peace officer, any state or local government agency
or personnel, o r t o a n y person licensed in this state
t o practice social work, psychology, or marriage a n d
family therapy, information concerning the commission of a n offense, knowing that the offense did
n o t occur o r knowing that he has n o information
relating t o the offense or danger.
199s
76-8-507. False personal information to peace
officer.

A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with
intent of misleading a peace officer as t o his identity, birth date, o r place of residence, he knowingly
gives a false n a m e , birth date, or address t o a peace
officer in the lawful discharge of his official dudes.19S3
76-8-508. Tampering with witness - Retaliation
against witness or informant - Bribery Communicating a threat.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if,
believing that a n official proceeding or investigation
is pending o r about to b e instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person t o :
(a) testify o r inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, docuCODE-CO

76-8-51Q,

ment, item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide
evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if
he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for
anything done by another as a witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the acts
specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to d o
bodily injury to the person, because of any act
performed or to be performed by the person in his
capacity as a witness or informant in an official
proceeding or investigation.
lses
76-8-508.5. Tampering with juror - Retaliation
against jnror - Penalty.
(1) As used in u i s section "juror" means a
person:
(a) summoned for jury duty; or
(b) serving as or having served as a juror or alternate juror in any court or as a juror on any grand
jury of the state.
(2) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if
he attempts to or actually influences a juror in the
discharge of the juror's service by:
(a) communicating with the juror by any means,
directly or indirectly, except for attorneys in lawful
discharge of their duties in open court;
(b) offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer any
benefit upon the juror; or
(c) communicating to the juror a threat that a
reasonable person would believe t o be a threat t o
injure:
(i) the juror's person or property; or
(ii) the person or property of any other person in
whose welfare the juror is interested.
(3) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if
he commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by the juror in the discharge of the
juror's service:
(a) t o the juror's person or property; or
(b) to the person or property of any other person
in whose welfare the juror is interested.
(4) Tampering with a juror is a third degree
felony.

1992

76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding.
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second
degree if by the use of force or by any threat which
would constitute a means of committing the crime
of theft by extortion under this code, if the threat
were employed to obtain property, or by promise of
any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to
induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the
dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a criminal
complaint, indictment, or information.
(2) " V i c t i m / as used in this section, includes a
child or other person under the care or custody of a
parent or guardian.
1973
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.
A person commits a felony of the second degree
if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything
with a purpose to impair its verity o r availability in
the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he

Utah Criminal and Traffic Code

481

(b) the damage or injury was not caused by an intentional or knowing act by the volunteer which constitutes
illegal, willful, or wanton misconduct.
(2) The protection against volunteer liability provided by
this section does not apply:
(a) to injuries resulting from a volunteer's operation of
a motor vehicle, a vessel, aircraft or other vehicle for
which a pilot or operator's license is required;
(b) when a suit is brought by an authorized officer of a
state or local government to enforce a federal, state, or
local law; or
(c) where the nonprofit organization for which the
volunteer is working fails to provide a financially secure
source of recovery for individuals who suffer injuries as a
result of actions taken by the volunteer on behalf of the
nonprofit organization.
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar an action by a volunteer against an organization, its officers, or other persons who
intentionally or knowingly misrepresent that a financially
secure source of recovery does or will exist during a period
when such a source does not or will not in fact exist.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to place a duty
upon a nonprofit organization to .provide a financially secure
source of recovery.
(5) The granting of immunity from liability to a volunteer
under this section shall have no effect on the liability of the
nonprofit organization providing the financially secure source
of recovery.
1990
78-19-3. Liability protection for organizations.
A nonprofit organization is not liable for the acts or omissions of its volunteers in any circumstance where:

(1) the acts of its volunteers are not as described in
Subsection 78-19-2(1) unless the nonprofit organization
had, or reasonably should have had, reasonable notice of
the volunteer's unfitness to provide services to the nonprofit organization under circumstances that make the
nonprofit organization's use of the volunteer reckless or
wanton in light of that notice; or
(2) a business employer would not be liable under the
laws of this state if the act or omission were the act or
omission of one of its employees.
1990
CHAPTER 20
RESERVED
PART III
PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 21
ISSUES AND TRIAL
Section
78-21-1.
78-21-2.
78-21-3.

556

JUDICIAL CODE

78-19-3

Right to jury trial.
Jury to decide questions of fact.
Court to decide questions of law.

78-21-1. Right to jury trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal
property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as
due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury
trial is waived or a reference is ordered.
1953

78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact.
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than
those mentioned in Section 78-21-3, are to be decided by the
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them,
except when otherwise provided.
1995

78-21-3. Court t o d e c i d e q u e s t i o n s of law.
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence,
the facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of
statutes and other writings, and the application of the rules of
evidence are to be decided by t h e court and all discussions of
law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is by
law made evidence of a fact, t h e court is to declare such
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it.
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78-22-1. Duration of judgment — Judgment as lien
upon real property — Abstract of judgment —
Small claims judgment not lien.
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed
in accordance with law.
(2) Prior to July 1,1997, except as limited by Subsection (4),
the entry ofjudgment by a district court is a lien upon the real
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution,
owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment,
located in the county in which the judgment is entered.
(3) Prior to and after July 1, 1997, an abstract of judgment
issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be
recorded in any court of this state and shall have the same
force and effect as a judgment entered in that court.
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims division of any court shall
not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to
the civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3).
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78-22-1.1.

J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t party d y i n g after v e r d i c t

or decision.
A judgment rendered where a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact, and before judgment, is not a
lien on the real property of t h e deceased party, but is payable
in the course of the administration of his estate.
1953

78-22-1.5. Definitions — Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments.
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments"
means the index where a judgment shall be recorded and
searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through
electronic means or by tangible document.
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment rendered or •
recorded in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect
the title to real property unless the judgment is recorded in
the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the
district court of the county in which the property is located.
(3) In addition to the requirement of Subsection (2), any
judgment that is recorded in the Registry of Judgments on or
after September 1, 1998, shall include a separate information
statement of the judgment creditor that contains:

